Casenote, Constitutional Law--Equal Protection--New York Statute Requiring Consent of Mother, But Not of Father, as Prerequisite to Adoption of Illegitimate Child Violates the Fourteenth Amendment Because It Draws Gender-Based Distinction Which Bears No Substantial Relation to State Interest in Encouraging Adoption of Illegitimate Children--\u3cem\u3eCaban v. Mohammed\u3c/em\u3e, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) by Radford, Mary F.
Georgia State University College of Law
Reading Room
Faculty Publications By Year Faculty Publications
1-1-1980
Casenote, Constitutional Law--Equal Protection--
New York Statute Requiring Consent of Mother,
But Not of Father, as Prerequisite to Adoption of
Illegitimate Child Violates the Fourteenth
Amendment Because It Draws Gender-Based
Distinction Which Bears No Substantial Relation
to State Interest in Encouraging Adoption of
Illegitimate Children--Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380 (1979)
Mary F. Radford
Georgia State University College of Law, mradford@gsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/faculty_pub
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Family Law Commons, Fourteenth
Amendment Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications By Year by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mary F. Radford, Casenote, Constitutional Law--Equal Protection--New York Statute Requiring Consent of Mother, But Not of
Father, as Prerequisite to Adoption of Illegitimate Child Violates the Fourteenth Amendment Because It Draws Gender-Based
Distinction Which Bears No Substantial Relation to State Interest in Encouraging Adoption of Illegitimate Children--Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), 29 Emory L.J. 833 (1980).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-NEw
YORK STATUTE REQUIRING CONSENT OF MOTHER, BUT NOT OF FA-
THER, As PREREQUISITE TO ADOPTION OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILD VIO-
LATES THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT BECAUSE IT DRAWS GENDER-
BASED DISTINCTION WHICH BEARS No SUBSTANTIAL RELATION TO
STATE INTEREST IN ENCOURAGING ADOPTION OF ILLEGITIMATE CHIL-
DREN-Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
Appellant Abdiel Caban and appellee Maria Mohammed1 lived
together out of wedlock for several years in New York City.2 Two
children were born to Maria Mohammed during this time,3 and ap-
pellant was identified as the father on each child's birth certifi-
cate.4 Appellant lived with and supported the family until appellee
left him, taking the children with her, and began residing with the
man she later married.5 During the two following years, appellant
remained in constant contact with the children.6 In January 1976,
appellees filed a petition to adopt the children.7 Two months later,
1 Appellees were Maria Mohammed and her husband Kazim Mohammed, who were
married in January 1974. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979).
2 For a five-year period between September 1968 and December 1973, appellant Abdiel
Caban and appellee Maria Mohammed represented themselves as husband and wife al-
though they were never legally married. 441 U.S. at 382. In New York, cohabitation does not
create a common-law marriage, and, in fact, that state's law does not recognize common-law
marriages under any circumstances. Rahill v. 645 Restaurant Corp., 59 App. Div. 2d 988, 399
N.Y.S.2d 342 (1977).
s The two children were David Andrew Caban, who was born on July 16, 1969, and
Denise Caban, who was born on March 12, 1971. 441 U.S. at 382.
4 Id.
5 Id. Appellee married Kazim Mohammed within a month after taking up residence
with him. Id.
I During the first nine months of her marriage, appellee took the children every week to
see her mother who lived in the same building as appellant. Appellant visited with the chil-
dren every time they came to see their grandmother. In September 1974, the grandmother,
at appellee's request, took the children with her to live in Puerto Rico. Appellant was able
to maintain contact with the children through his parents who also lived in Puerto Rico.
Appellees maintained that they planned to join the children as soon as they had saved
enough money to start a business in Puerto Rico. Id. at 382-83.
1 The appellees filed the petition under the New York Domestic Relations Law which
provided in part that "[a]n adult or minor husband and his adult or minor wife together
may adopt a child of either of them born in or out of wedlock and an adult or minor hus-
band or an adult or minor wife may adopt such a child of the other spouse." N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 110 (McKinney 1977). 441 U.S. at 383.
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appellant and his wife8 filed a cross-petition for adoption.9 The
New York Surrogate granted the appellees' petition to adopt,10
basing his, decision on a New York Domestic Relations Law which
provided in part that the "consent to adoption shall be required
... [only] of the mother ... of a child born out of wedlock."
Because the natural mother withheld her consent, appellant was
foreclosed from adopting the children.12 The Surrogate's opinion
was affirmed by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Divi-
sion,13 and the New York Court of Appeals.1 4 On certiorari, held,
reversed. A state adoption law requiring that only the natural
mother, but not the natural father, consent to the adoption of an
illegitimate child violates the equal protection clause of the Four-
8 Appellant Caban married another woman subsequent to appellee's departure with the
children and prior to the adoption proceedings. 441 U.S. at 383.
9 A hearing on the petition and cross-petition was held before a Law Assistant to a New
York Surrogate in Kings County, New York, at which both appellant and appellees were
permitted to present and cross-examine witnesses. Id.
10 Id. at 383-84.
n At the time of the proceedings before the Surrogate, New York law provided that
consent to adoption was required of only the following individuals or agencies:
(a) Of the adoptive child, if over fourteen years of age, unless the judge or
surrogate in his discretion dispenses with such consent;
(b) Of the parents or surviving parent, whether adult or infant, of a child born
in wedlock;
(c) Of the mother, whether adult or infant, of a child born out of wedlock;
(d) Of any person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the adoptive
child.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977). As subsection (c) of the statute makes clear by
omission, New York law did not require the consent of the natural father for the adoption
by another of his illegitimate child. Id.
" Because the children were born out of wedlock, the consent of the natural mother
alone was required for their adoption. The appellant, even though he was the natural father
of the children, had no rights under New York law to adopt the children independent of the
mother's consent. See note 11 supra.
13 See In re David Andrew C., 56 App. Div. 2d 627, 391 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1977). In re-
sponse to appellant's claim that the New York Domestic Relations Law was unconstitu-
tional because it did not allow a father to object to the adoption by another of his illegiti-
mate children, the court responded that such a claim had already been found to be without
merit in In re Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975),
appeal dismised for want of a substantial federal question sub nom. Orsini v. Blasi, 423
U.S. 1042 (1977). The Malpica-Orsini case is discussed at notes 68-82 infra and accompany-ing text.
2' See In re David A.C., 43 N.Y.2d 708, 372 N.E.2d 42, 401 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1977). This
court agreed with the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, that appellant's claim
was only a restatement of a question which had been resolved previously. See note 13 supra.
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teenth Amendment because it bears no substantial relation to the
state's interest in facilitating the adoption of children born out of
wedlock. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
Prior to 1972, the father of an illegitimate child had few, if any,
rights in his child. 15 State adoption statutes typically were silent
regarding any interests the putative father might assert in his
child,16 requiring neither that he consent nor that notice be given
to him as a prerequisite for the adoption of his child by a third
party.17 Those states which were willing to recognize parental
rights in the putative father usually required that he establish his
paternity through a judicial proceeding before acquiring even lim-
ited rights to control the fate of his child.18
15 For an overview of the rights of putative fathers as they existed prior to 1972, see
Embick, The Illegitimate Father, 3 J. FAm. L. 321 (1963). The rights of putative fathers are
basically an extension of the protection which historically has been provided by the United
States Supreme Court to the family relationship. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942), the Court found that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
covered marriage as one of the "basic civil rights of man." Id. at 541. In Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923), the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was expanded to
cover the rights "to marry, establish a home and bring up children .... ." Id. at 399. In
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), a law prohibiting parents from sending
their children to private schools was found to be an unconstitutional restraint on the due
process right of parents to raise their children as they saw fit. The "private realm of family
life which the state cannot enter" was recognized and respected in Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). In this case the Court stated, "It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents ... ."Id. This interest in
the "companionship, care, custody, and management of his ... children" subsequently was
extended to putative fathers who had "sired and raised" their children in Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651 (1971). See generally Garvey, Child, Parent, State, and the Due Process
Clause: An Essay on the Supreme Court's Recent Work, 51 S. CAL. L. Rxv. 769, 804-22
(1978).
16 See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.235 (1957); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW art. VII (McKinney
1966); ORE. Rxv. CODE § 109.326 (1967). The Oregon statute stated boldly the impact of
these laws: "If the mother is dead or unknown, consent shall be obtained in the same man-
ner as if such child had no living parent." Id.
17 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 20.10.020(3) (1962); DzL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 908 (1953);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 72.14 (1964); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403 (Supp. 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4,
§§ 9.1-1, 9.1-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.500 (1972); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 210, § 2 (Michie/Law Co-op Supp. 1972); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney
Supp. 1973).
18 See, e.g., Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-106, 8-11 (Supp. 1970) (consent required of any
putative father who had acknowledged his parentage under oath in a document filed with
the court or state adoption agency, notice by personal service of the hearing on the adoption
petition required to be given to such father); AR& STAT. ANN. §§ 56-104, 56-106 (Supp.
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In 1972, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the rights of
unwed fathers for the first time-in Stanley v. Illinois.18 In that
case, the Court examined an Illinois statute which stated that the
only "parent" of an illegitimate child was the child's natural
mother.2 0 Petitioner Stanley had lived with a woman intermit-
tently for eighteen years during which time he fathered, raised,
and supported three children.21 When the children's mother died,
they were declared wards of the state because, pursuant to Illinois
law,22 they were considered no longer to have any living "parent."23
Declaring that petitioner had no right to protest because he was
not considered a "parent," the state placed the children with
court-appointed guardians despite the natural father's objections.2'
Petitioner attacked the Illinois law on the ground that it denied
him the protections granted to married fathers and unwed mothers
who could not be deprived of their children unless they had been
shown to be unfit parents. 5 The Supreme Court struck down the
1969) (consent required of putative father whose paternity has been established by court
order; such father, along with all other persons whose consent is required, to be made defen-
dant in adoption proceedings); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-120 (Burns Supp. 1970) (consent re-
quired of putative father whose paternity has been established by a court proceeding).
' 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
20 ILL. Rmi. STAT. ch. 37, § 701 (1966) provided in part- "'Parents' means the father and
mother of a legitimate child, or the survivor of them, or the natural mother of an illegiti-
mate child, arid includes any adoptive parent." Id. (emphasis added).
21 405 U.S. at 646.
2 See note 20 supra for the text of the relevant Illinois statute which, by omission,
refused to recognize an unwed father as a legal parent.
In re Stanley, 45 III. 2d 132, 133, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (1970).
24 The Illinois Supreme Court suggested that Stanley could have become a legal parent
of the children if he had applied for adoption or custody and control of the children. Id. at
135, 256 N.E.2d at 815-16. Stanley had made no attempt to gain recognition of himself
either as the children's father through adoption, or as legal custodian of the children
through a guardianship proceeding prior to the dependency hearing. When their mother
died, he placed them in the care of the couple who later were appointed by the court to be
the children's legal guardians. The state initiated the dependency proceeding when it be-
came known that there was no one who had any legally enforceable obligation for the care of
the children. Even at the dependency hearing, Stanley made no affirmative effort to take
responsibility for the children himself. Hd merely objected to the designation of the couple
as legal guardians and seemed concerned that he would no longer receive welfare payments
after such designation. 405 U.S. at 667 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. 19).
25 Illinois law at that time provided that children were "dependent," and thus in need
of legally-appointed guardians, if they were under eighteen years of age and had no living
"parent," ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 702(5) (1967). The Illinois Supreme Court did not con-
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Illinois statute as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment" and
held that all parents, including unwed fathers, were constitution-
ally entitled to a hearing on their fitness as parents before their
children could be removed from their custody.27
Although Stanley appealed to the Supreme Court only on the
ground that the Illinois statute denied him the equal protection
afforded to unwed mothers and married fathers, the Court went on
to find the statute to be in violation of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.2 8 The majority intertwined the two
bases for its decision, stating that,
as a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a
hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were
taken from him and that, by denying him a hearing and ex-
tending it to all other parents whose custody of their children
is challenged, the State denied Stanley the equal protection
aider Stanley's parental fitness an issue because, since he had not married the children's
mother, he was not even considered a "parent" under the statute. In re Stanley, 45 IM. 2d
132, 134, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (1970). See note 20 supra for the text of the relevant Illinois
statute which did not recognize an unwed father as a "parent."
1 The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of the citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
405 U.S. at 658.
"3 Id. The commentators disagree whether the Stanley decision was based solely on
equal protection grounds or on both due process and equal protection grounds. One writer
believes that although the Court's opinion was primarily a discussion of procedural due pro-
cess, the due process claim technically was not available to petitioner since he had pressed
only his equal protection claim. Comment, The "Strange Boundaries" of Stanley: Providing
Notice of Adoption to the Unknown Putative Father, 59 VA. L. Rav. 517, 518 n.12 (1973).
Another student author argues that the Supreme Court struck down the Illinois statute on
both grounds: the statute was violative of due process because it created a presumption of
parental unfitness from the fact of illegitimacy, and also was invalid on equal protection
grounds because it denied an unwed father the same hearing on parental fitness that would
be given a married parent. Comment, Illegitimacy and the Rights of Unwed Fathers in
Adoption Proceedings after Quilloin v. Walcott, 12 JOHN MARSHALL J. 383, 384-85 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, JoHN MARSHALu J.]. Chief Justice Burger, in his dissenting
opinion in Stanley, criticized the majority for analyzing the case on due process grounds
when "[n]o due process issue was raised in the state courts; and no due process issue was
decided by any state court." 405 U.S. at 659 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.29
The Court discussed the due process implications of Stanley in
terms of badancing the state's interest in depriving the petitioner of
the custody of his children against the petitioner's interest in
maintaining the familial relationship he had already established
with his children.30 The Court found Stanley's private interest in
retaining custody of his children to be both "cognizable and sub-
stantial,"8 1 while the state's interest in upholding the statute
seemed grounded only in the efficacious handling of all cases in-
volving illegitimate children.3 2 The Court concluded that Stanley's
interest far outweighed that of the state and struck down the Illi-
nois statute as violative of the due process clause because it pre-
cluded an individualized case-by-case determination and balancing
of interests. 33
The Supreme Court in Stanley held merely that the father of an
illegitimate child could not be deprived of the custody of his child
without a hearing on his parental qualifications.3' The Supreme
Court did not hold that fathers of illegitimate children should al-
ways be presumed to be fit parents of their children; it only struck
down a statute which created an irrebuttable presumption that all
unwed fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents. 5
Although the factual situation in Stanley involved a dependency
and custody hearing,8 the impact of the case was felt most
:9 405 U.S. at 649.
80 Id. at 651-52.
" Id. at 652. The majority seemingly ignored the fact that Stanley was not the actual
custodian of the children at the time of the dependency hearing. See note 24 supra.
' The Ccurt criticized the state's procedure of not allowing any unwed father any
rights in his child as "procedure by presumption." 405 U.S. at 656. Administrative conve-
nience, followed because it is "cheaper and easier than individualized determination," could
not be exalted o ,er a father's parental rights in his children. Id. at 656-57.
3 Id. at 657-58.
34 Id. at 658.
" Id. at 654.
36 Immediately following Stanley, the Supreme Court remanded a similar custody case
to the Illinois court for reconsideration in light of the Stanley decision. Vanderlaan v. Van-
derlaan, 126 Ill. App. 2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 717 (1970), vacated and remanded, 405 U.S. 1051
(1972), involved a ruling by an Illinois court which denied the custody of an illegitimate
child to the putative father because the child's natural mother was alive and also wanted
[Vol. 29838
1980] RECENT DECISIONS 839
strongly in the area of adoption 7 and the right of fathers of illegit-
imate children to prevent the adoption of their children by third
parties.3 The Supreme Court did not consider the rights of puta-
tive fathers in the context of an adoption case until 1978 in Quil-
loin v. Walcott.39 The issue in Quilloin was the constitutionality of
a Georgia adoption statute that effectively denied an unwed father
the right to prevent the adoption of his illegitimate child by vest-
ing all parental rights to an illegitimate child in the natural
mother.' e
custody. The appellate court's earlier holding that the putative father had no right to the
society of his illegitimate child was clearly contradictory to the holding in Stanley. See text
accompanying notes 31-34 supra. On remand, the Illinois court decided that unwed fathers
could no longer be considered automatically ineligible for custody. 9 III. App. 3d 260, 262,
292 N.E.2d 145, 146 (1972).
37 At the same time the Supreme Court remanded Vanderlaan, discussed at note 36
supra, for reconsideration in the light of Stanley, it also remanded a case involving the
adoption of an illegitimate child. In State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 47 Wis. 2d
420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970), vacated and remanded sub nom. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social
Servs., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972), an unwed father was denied both notice and a hearing prior to
the adoption of his child. His petition for custody and control was denied by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, which held that the statute giving exclusive control of an illegitimate child
to its mother did not deny the father equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 47 Wis. 2d at 434, 178 N.W.2d at 63. On remand, the Wisconsin court held
that the statute unconstitutionally denied the rights of unwed fathers because it did not
provide these fathers with a hearing to determine their fitness as parents. In a subsequent
hearing, however, the father was found to be unfit and the court approved the adoption
which had already taken place. In doing so, the court affirmed the value of maintaining the
family relationship that had been created by that adoption. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran
Social Servs., 68 Wis. 2d 36, 42, 227 N.W.2d 643, 647 (1975).
'i In the three years following Stanley, many states overturned adoption statutes that
vested the rights to illegitimate children solely in their natural mothers. See, e.g., Miller v.
Miller, 504 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1974) (Oregon statute permitting adoption of illegitimate
children upon the consent of natural mother alone held unconstitutional); E. v. T., 124 N.J.
Super. 535, 308 A.2d 41 (1973) (New Jersey statute which gave unwed mothers exclusive
right to custody and control of their children overturned); Hamm ack v. Wise, 211 S.E.2d
118 (1975) (unwed fathers found to be entitled to benefits of law that a parent will not be
denied custody of his child unless there is clear and convincing proof he is unfit). For dis-
cussions of the impact of Stanley on the issue of the rights of unwed fathers, see Barron,
Notice to the Unwed Father and Termination of Parental Rights: Implementing Stanley v.
Illinois, 9 FAm. L.Q. 527 (1975); Comment, Protecting the Putative Father's Rights After
Stanley v. Illinois: Problems in Implementation, 13 J. FAM. L. 115 (1973); Comment, The
"Strange Boundaries" of Stanley: Providing Notice to the Unknown Putative Father, 59
VA. L. REv. 517 (1973).
:9 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
40 The sections of the Georgia adoption statute at issue in this case were GA. CODE ANN.
EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
Quilloin involved a petition for the adoption of an eleven-year-
old child by the husband of the child's natural mother. In contrast
to the factual situation in Stanley,41 the natural father in Quilloin
had never established a home with the child's natural mother, nor
was the child in the custody and control of his father at any time.'2
It was not until the mother's husband filed a petition to adopt the
child that the father even attempted to secure visitation rights.'3
After being notified that an adoption petition had been filed, ap-
pellant fied a petition to legitimate the child." He subsequently
amended his pleadings to claim that certain sections of the Georgia
adoption statute were unconstitutional because they denied him
the same rights granted to married fathers and unwed mothers and
assumed unmarried fathers to be unfit as a matter of law.4' The
§ 74-203 and § 74-403(3) (1975). Section 74-203 provided, "The mother of an illegitimate
child shall be ntitled to the possession of the child, unless the father shall legitimate him
.... Being the only recognized parent, she may exercise all the paternal [sic] power." GA.
CODE ANN. § 74-203 (1975). (The Georgia Supreme Court indicated in its Quilloin opinion
that the word "paternal" in this statute was a misprint and was intended to be "parental."
238 Ga. 230, 231, 232 S.E.2d 246, 247 (1977)). Section 74-403(3), which related to the con-
sent required for adoption, stated:
Illegitimate children.-If the child be illegitimate, the consent of the mother alone
shall suffice. Such consent, however, shall not be required if the mother has sur-
rendered all of her rights to said child to a licensed child-placing agency, or to the
State Derartment of Family and Children Services.
GA. CODE AmN. § 74-403(3) (1975).
42 See tert accompanying note 21 supra.
". 238 Ga. 230, 231, 232 S.E.2d 246, 247 (1977). The child had lived with his maternal
grandparents cr mother all of his life. Although the father had visited him on occasion, the
primary support for the child had come from his mother and maternal grandparents. Id.
43 Id.
4' The Georgia statute which was operative at the time stated:
A father cf an illegitimate child may render the same legitimate by petitioning the
superior court of the county of his residence, setting forth the name, age, and sex
of such child, and also the name of the mother; and if he desires the name
changed, stating the new name, and praying the legitimation of such child. Of this
application the mother, if alive, shall have notice. Upon such application,
presented and filed, the court may pass an order declaring said child to be legiti-
mate, and capable of inheriting from the father in the same manner as if born in
lawful wedlock, and the name by which he or she shall be known.
GA. CODE ANN. § 74-103 (1975). Appellant did not seek custody of the child nor did he
object to the child's continuing to live with appellees, but rather sought only to block the
adoption of the child by the mother's husband. His reasons for doing so were not stated in
the record. 4341 U.S. at 247, 249-50.
45 434 U.S. at 250.
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superior court, considering both the legitimation and the adoption
petitions in the same hearing,46 examined several factors, including
the father's sporadic support of the child, the stable condition of
the mother's marriage, and the child's express desire to be adopted
by and assume the surname of his stepfather.7 The superior court
concluded that legitimation was not in "the best interests of the
child 14 8 and granted the stepfather's petition for adoption. The
Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.'9
The United States Supreme Court sought to give a more "com-
plete answer to [appellant's] attack on the constitutionality" 50 of
the Georgia adoption statute by examining whether the statute it-
self, in conjunction with the application of the "best interests of
the child" standard, provided adequate protection of appellant's
interests. 51
The Court discussed the constitutionality of the statute in terms
of both the due process and equal protection clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment.5 2 Focusing first on the due process issue, the
Court found that the substantive due process rights"3 of the natu-
46 Although such petitions are usually considered in separate hearings, the superior
court allowed a concurrent hearing to permit the father to have "a right to be heard with
respect to any issue or other thing upon which he desire[s]. . . ." 434 U.S. at 250 (quoting
In re Walcott, Adoption Case No. 8466 (Ga. Super. Ct., July 12, 1976), App. 70).
47 434 U.S. at 251. In Georgia, the consent of the child to be adopted was not required
unless he or she was over 14 years of age. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(1) (1973). The child in the
instant case was 11 years old at the time of these proceedings.
's The "best interests of the child" is the standard employed in many state adoption
statutes and by many courts to measure the various issues in a child placement situation.
The phrase is broad and may encompass financial, psychological, religious, and social fac-
tors. While some commentators approve of the retention of this phrase in adoption statutes,
see Comment, In the Child's Best Interests: Rights of the Natural Parents in Child Place-
ment Proceedings, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 446 (1976), other writers have suggested replacing the
vague standard with a more precise test, defined as "the least detrimental available alterna-
tive for safeguarding the child's growth and development." See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. Fn!auD & A.
SOLNrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTaEsTs OF THE CHILD 53 (1973) [hereinafter cited as J.
GOLDSTEIN].
49 238 Ga. 230, 232 S.E.2d 246 (1977). The Georgia Supreme Court stated that the fact
that the father had taken no steps to legitimate or support the child during the 11 years
preceding the adoption spoke strongly in favor of the adoption. Id. at 233, 232 S.E.2d at 248.
50 434 U.S. at 254.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See note 15 supra for a discussion of the cases in which this right was developed.
842 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
ral father were not violated by the Georgia court's application of
the "best interests of the child" standard." The Court noted that
the father's due process rights would have been violated had the
court broken up an already existing family unit over the objections
of the parents and the children without some showing of parental
unfitness."' In contrast, the effect of the adoption in this case was
to "give full recognition to a family unit already in existence
.... MS The Court indicated that a putative father who, like the
appellant, had never had nor sought actual or legal custody of his
child was not entitled to the same due process rights as those ac-
corded to the putative father in Stanley who had shown some tan-
gible interest in his child.57 Justice Marshall, writing for the major-
ity, therefore distinguished Quilloin from Stanley because Quilloin
had never established the relationship with his child that the puta-
tive father had established with his children in Stanley.5 8
Quilloin's equal protection argument was based on the conten-
1" 434 U.S. at 254. The Court refused to base its decision solely on the ground that the
appellant had made no attempt to legitimate the child during the preceding 11 years, prima-
rily because the appellant apparently had not been aware of the existence of the legitima-
tion procedure. Id. Nonetheless, the Court was clearly influenced by the fact that the appel-
lant had never "had, or sought, actual or legal custody of the child." Id. at 255.
I Id. The Court contrasted the case at bar with a situation in which an existing family
unit was to be dissolved and the child was to be placed with a new set of parents. In such a
case, the Court implied, fitness would be an issue. Id. See generally Note, Consent of "Un-
fit" Parents Needed For Adoption-Unless Their Rights Are First Terminated, 28 MERCER
L. Rav. 553 (1.977).
" 434 U.S. at 255.
I7 d.
Justice Marshall said:
In Stanley v. Illinois, ... this Court held that the State of Illinois was
barred, a3 a matter of both due process and equal protection, from taking custody
of the children of an unwed father, absent a hearing and a particularized finding
that the father was an unfit parent. The Court concluded, on the one hand, that a
father's interest in the "companionship, care, custody, and management" of his
children is "cognizable and substantial".. . , and, on the other hand, that the
State's interest in caring for the children is'"de minimis" if the father is in fact a
fit parent .... Stanley left unresolved the degree of protection a State must
afford to the rights of an unwed father in a situation, such as that presented here,
in which the countervailing interests are more substantial.
Id. at 247-48. The "countervailing interests" here included the fact that the child had lived
in a familial relationship with his stepfather for several years preceding the adoption and
that the natural father had not sought to support or legitimate the child during that time.
Id. at 247, 255.
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tion that the Georgia adoption statute did not entitle him to the
same veto power regarding the adoption of his child as was pro-
vided to married parents, divorced parents, and unwed mothers. 5
The Supreme Court addressed this issue only as it pertained to the
disparate treatment of unwed fathers and married, separated, or
divorced fathers.60 The Court concluded that the discriminatory
treatment of unwed as opposed to wed fathers was valid because
wed fathers willingly took on the full responsibility for the rearing
of their children during the course of the marriage."1 The Court
held that allowing a qualified veto power to an unwed father was
justified because the state recognized that married, divorced, or
separated fathers were generally more committed to the welfare of
their children than were unwed fathers.6 2 According to the Court,
the legitimate state interest in encouraging the welfare of the chil-
dren outweighed appellant's allegation that he was denied equal
protection of the laws."
It has been said that Quilloin clarified the breadth of the hold-
ing in Stanley." Stanley essentially held that an unwed father
could not be deprived of the custody of his children without a
hearing on his fitness as a parent.6 5 The Stanley decision was
taken by some judges and legislators to mean that all unwed fa-
thers, not merely those who lived with their children, were entitled
to the same rights as unwed mothers and married parents in any
case involving the custody or adoption of their children.6 6 Quilloin
11 Id. at 252.
" The Court stated in a footnote that it refused to consider Quilloin's claim that the
statute also made gender-based distinctions in violation of the equal protection clause be-
cause appellant did not present this claim in his jurisdictional statement. Id. at 253 n.13.
61 Id. at 256. The Court again noted that Quilloin was not even seeking to take on this
responsibility with the legitimation petition, and was not complaining "of his exemption
from these responsibilities." Id.
62 Id. The Court noted that "even a father whose marriage has broken apart will have
borne full responsibility for the rearing of his children during the period of the marriage."
Id.
63 Id.
See Comment, JOHN MARSHALL J., supra note 28, at 384.
65 See notes 21-30 supra and accompanying text.
66 See, e.g., the dissenting opinion in Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. 230, 234-35, 232
S.E.2d 246, 249-50 (1977) (Undercofler, J., dissenting). Also illustrative of this broad inter-
pretation of Stanley were the amendments to the Illinois adoption statutes following that
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limited Stanley by emphasizing that the presence of a de facto
family relationship between the unwed father and his illegitimate
children was a prerequisite without which the Stanley tenets
would not be applied. 7 Neither case, however, addressed whether
adoption statutes which discriminate between unwed fathers and
unwed mothers violate the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. In Stanley, the children's mother had died, so
the appellant was not competing with her for the custody of their
children. In Quilloin, the father had not established any familial
case. Under the revised statutes, the state must either procure the consent of an unwed
father or terminate his parental rights through a neglect proceeding before allowing the
adoption of his child. ILL. Ray. STAT. ch. 40, § 1510 (1977). The obvious result of this rule
would be to impede severely the adoption of illegitimate children whose fathers could not be
identified or located.
67 See notes 52-58 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the lack of a de
facto family relationship in Quilloin. State courts have responded to the Supreme Court
holdings in Stanley and Quillion in a variety of ways. The Kansas Court of Appeals, for
example, sought to compromise between the holdings in the two cases by requiring only
maternal consent: for the adoption of an illegitimate child, while at the same time stating
that the putative father has a paramount custody right to his illegitimate child in contests
with third parties. See In re Lathrop, 2 Kan. App. 2d 90, 575 P.2d 894 (1978). For a discus-
sion of this case, see Note, Parental Rights: The Putative Father, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 174
(1978). The Louisiana Court of Appeals, on the other hand, seemingly ignored the United
States Supreme Court's de facto family theory in In re Martin, 357 So. 2d 893 (La. App.
1978). In that case, the court held that the putative father's consent to the adoption of his
child was not required even though he had lived with and supported his child for seventeen
months. The court denied the father power to veto the adoption merely because he had
failed to sign the child's birth certificate. Even though the certificate bore his name, the
court found that, without the signature, the father had not formally acknowledged the child
as his own. 357 So. 2d at 894. The Supreme Court of Alaska took a somewhat more moder-
ate approach in Adoption of L.A.H., 597 P.2d 513 (Alaska 1979). The Alaska court agreed
with the Louisiana court that a putative father would not be allowed to object to the adop-
tion of his child unless he had formally acknowledged the child as his own. The Alaska
court, however, relaxed the rigid time regulations surrounding the formalities of the ac-
knowledgement by allowing the father to file the acknowledgement at any time before the
final entry of the adoption decree. Id. at 517. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, in a
case decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Quilloin but after Stanley, clearly
delineated a standard which based the putative father's rights in an adoption hearing on the
theory of the de facto family relationship. In Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Servs. v. Herzog, 317 So. 2d 865 (FI. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), the court stated that the putative
father's rights in an adoption hearing depended upon whether "the child has been living
with the father or ... the father has contributed to its support or given any other tangible
indication of an interest in the child . . . ." Id. at 867. The exact wording of this court's
holding was adopted by the legislature of a neighboring state, Georgia, in the 1977 revision
of its adoption laws. See GA. CODE ANN. § 74-406(b) (1977).
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bonds with his children, so the contest was not between the mother
and the father, but between a parent who had had custody of and
supported the child and one who had not. The question left open
after Stanley and Quilloin concerned the rights of two parents who
were on relatively equal footing, each of whom desired custody of
the child born to them out of wedlock.
In In re Malpica-Orsini,68 the New York Court of Appeals was
faced with such a situation: two unwed parents, who opposed each
other in an adoption proceeding, had both lived with and sup-
ported their illegitimate child. Appellant had lived with his illegiti-
mate child and her mother for two years following the child's birth,
when he was forced to leave by the child's mother.60 He continued
to make support payments even after he left, and, in a judicial pro-
ceeding, admitted paternity of the child.7 0 The mother subse-
quently married the respondent, who then petitioned to adopt the
child. 1 When notified of the adoption proceedings, the child's nat-
ural father moved to dismiss the respondent's petition.72 Opposing
the petition, appellant alleged that the New York Domestic Rela-
tions Law, which required the consent of the natural mother alone
for the adoption of an illegitimate child and consequently gave the
natural father no power to veto the adoption, 3 was violative of the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.7
The New York Court of Appeals summarily dismissed appel-
lant's due process argument by observing that appellant had been
given notice, the right to object, and the right to a full hearing with
representation by an attorney on the issue of whether the adoption
68 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975), appeal dismissed for want
of a substantial federal question sub nom. Orsini v. Blasi, 423 U.S. 1042 (1977).
" Id. at 540, 331 N.E.2d at 501, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
70 Id. When the mother moved to a new address, however, she refused to accept further
support payments from the father and did not allow him to visit his daughter. Id.
71 New York law approves step-parent adoptions of illegitimate children. See note 7
supra and accompanying text.
72 36 N.Y.2d at 569, 331 N.E.2d at 487, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
73 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw (McKinney 1977) § 111. See note 11 supra for the text of this
law.
7, 36 N.Y.2d at 569, 331 N.E.2d at 487, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
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was in the best interests of the child.76 Addressing appellant's
equal protection challenge, the court examined whether the state's
reasons for making the broad gender-based statutory distinction
between unwed fathers and unwed mothers were "reasonable, not
arbitrary" and bore "a fair substantial relation to the object of the
legislation."7 The New York court found that the statute did not
violate the equal protection clause because the disparate treatment
of unwed fathers. and unwed mothers was justified by the state's
interest in promoting the welfare of children.7 7 Among the reasons
why granting veto power in adoption proceedings to unwed fathers
would be harmful to the well-being of potential adoptees, the court
cited the great difficulty and expense that would be encountered if
every putative father had to be located to ascertain his willingness
to consent, 7  and the fact that many couples would be dissuaded
from adopting children out of fear of having the adoption later
overturned by fathers who could not be located prior to the adop-
tion proceedings. 79 The court also noted the possibility that some
fathers might use this veto power to free themselves from the bur-
den of support or as a means of revenge against the child's
75 Id. at 577, 331 N.E.2d at 492, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 520. One member of the New York
Court of Appeals disagreed that these rights met the threshold of due process. In his dis-
sent, Judge Jones contended that the Stanley decision mandated not only that an unwed
father be granted the right to participate in the hearing, but also that he be granted the
right to prevent the adoption. Id. at 578, 331 N.E.2d at 494, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 522 (Jones, J.,
dissenting).
71 Id. at 571, 331 N.E.2d at 488, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 515. The New York court cited Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), as authority for its use of this standard in analyzing an equal
protection claim. 36 N.Y.2d at 571, 331 N.E.2d at 489, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 515. Judge Jones, in
his dissent, criticized the majority for not using the traditional "two-tiered" approach to
equal protection problems and called the majority's standard "little more than language of
result engrafted on a rational basis test." Id. at 580, 331 N.E.2d at 495, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 523
(Jones, J. dissenting). Judge Jones felt that the stricter two-tiered approach, or the "com-
pelling governmental interest" test, should be applied. Id. at 581, 331 N.E.2d at 495, 370
N.Y.S.2d at 524 (Jones, J., dissenting). Under this standard, laws which discriminate be-
tween persons similarly situated can be justified only by a showing that the discriminatory
treatment is necessary to promote a compelling state interest and that the statutory scheme
represents the least restrictive alternative appropriate to the relief sought. Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
77 36 N.Y.2d at 577, 331 N.E.2d at 493, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
78 Id. at 572, 331 N.E.2d at 489, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
79 Id. at 572, 331 N.E.2d at 489, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
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mother, 0 and the probability that marriages would be discouraged
because of the reluctance of prospective husbands to involve them-
selves in a situation where they could not adopt their wives' chil-
dren.81 The New York Court of Appeals concluded that the state's
interest in promoting a normal home life for all children justified
its denial of a veto power in adoption proceedings to all unwed
fathers, regardless of whether they had acknowledged paternity or
contributed to the support of the illegitimate child.82
The United States Supreme Court in its recent decision in
Caban v. Mohammed8 disagreed with the New York Court of Ap-
peals, holding that the New York Domestic Relations Law84 which
denied an unwed father the power to oppose his child's adoption
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 15 The fact situation in Caban8" was similar to that in both
80 Id. at 573, 331 N.E.2d at 490, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 517-18. The Georgia Supreme Court
voiced the same apprehension in its opinion in Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. 230, 233, 232
S.E.2d 246, 248 (1977). The court expressed the fear that "there would be very real danger
of profit seeking by the father in order to secure his consent to the adoption." Id., 232
S.E.2d at 248.
81 36 N.Y.2d at 573, 331 N.E.2d at 490, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
82 In this context, the court noted:
To contend that at least some of the fathers of children born out of wedlock
should be accorded the option or veto of consent is meaningless as far as amelio-
rating the problem. To grant this right to those who acknowledge paternity would
require a most difficult search and constant inquiry. To extend it to those who
have contributed to the support of the child would be an excursion into relative
values difficult of proof. To allow it for fathers adjudicated to be such in compul-
sory proceedings would not alleviate the situation measurably since they are likely
to be resentful and their legally enforced nexus with the child bears no relation-
ship to their entitlement. The mere possibility of a presently existing right on the
part of even some fathers, or one that might be acquired at a later date, no matter
how restrictive the group to whom the right granted may be, is enough to discour-
age a wide range of prospective placements and adoptions.
Id. at 576, 331 N.E.2d at 492, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
83 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
'8 See note 11 supra for the text of this law.
85 Unlike its approach in the preceding decisions of Stanley, discussed at notes 19-35
supra and accompanying text, and Quilloin, discussed at notes 39-63 supra and accompany-
ing text, the Supreme Court in Caban did not discuss appellant's due process claim but
rather limited its focus to the claim of gender-based discrimination under the equal protec-
tion clause. 441 U.S. at 394 n.16. In a footnote, the Caban Court dismissed the Stanley-
based due process claim. Because the majority found the New York statute to be unconsti-
tutional under the equal protection clause, the Court saw no need to express a view on
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Stanley 7 and Malpica-Orsini 8 In each case the unwed father not
only had lived for some time with his illegitimate children"9 and
had acknowledged his paternity, but also by his actions had cre-
ated a de facto family relationship which went beyond the mere
biological fact that he was their natural father.90 In Caban, how-
ever, the two contesting parents were each married,91 both were
capable of providing the children with a stable home environment,
and both were petitioning to adopt the children.9 2 The New York
"whether a State is constitutionally barred from ordering adoption in the absence of a de-
teimination that the parent whose rights are being terminated is unfit." Id. In his dissenting
opinion, Justice Stevens also rejected appellant's due process claim, but disagreed with the
majority's reason for doing so. In Justice Stevens' view, the fact that the father previously
had taken no steps to legitimate the child overcame any protection the due process clause
otherwise would have provided him on the basis of the former relationship he had had with
the child. Id. at 414-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court also stated in a footnote that it
would express no view concerning the distinction made by the New York statute between
married and unmarried fathers since it had already resolved the case on the grounds of sex-
based discrimination. Id. at 394 n.16.
" See notes 1-9 supra and accompanying text for the facts in Caban.
6 See notes 19-25 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts in
Stanley.
" See notes 68-74 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts in
Malpica-Orsini.
! Caban had lived with his older child for four and one half years and with his younger
child for two years before their mother took them with her to live with her new husband.
441 U.S. at 382. Stanley had lived with a woman for eighteen years during which time he
had fathered and supported three children. 405 U.S. at 646. The father in Malpica-Orsini
had lived with and supported his child for at least two years before the mother forced him
to leave. 36 NX.2d at 569, 331 N.E.2d at 487, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
90 The major factual distinction between the Stanley and Malpica-Orsini cases and
Quilloin was the fact that Mr. Quilloin had at no point, through any voluntary actions, lived
with or contributed to the support of his child to the extent necessary to create a de facto
family relationship. See note 42 supra and accompanying text. Much of the rationale of the
Supreme Court's decision in Quilloin rests on this factual distinction. See 434 U.S. at 247-
48.
91 Appellant Abdiel Caban married another woman subsequent to the departure of the
children with their mother. Appellee Maria Mohammed married Kazim Mohammed within
a month after she left appellant. 441 U.S. at 382. The records do not indicate that either of
the fathers in Stanley or Malpica-Orsini were married at the time they attempted to veto
the adoptions.
92 Id. at 383. In Stanley, the petitioner sought neither the custody nor the adoption of
the child himself but wished only to block the state from appointing guardians for his chil-
dren. 45 Ill. 2d at 133, 256 N.E.2d at 815, discussed at note 24 supra and accompanying text.
In Malpica-Orsini the child's father had nmade no petition to adopt his child himself; he
merely sought to prevent the child's adoption by the mother's husband. 36 N.Y.2d at 569,
331 N.E.2d at 487, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 513, discussed at note 72 supra and accompanying text.
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statute, however, automatically precluded the father from adopting
his children" and from preventing their adoption by their mother's
husband.9
Justice Powell, writing for the majority,9 5 began his examination
of the New York law by noting that it clearly treated unmarried
parents differently on the basis of their sex.96 The Court then
turned to the appellees' claim that the statute did not violate the
equal protection clause because it was substantially related to valid
governmental objectives.9 7 The appellees asserted that the statu-
tory distinction between unwed fathers and unwed mothers was
justified by a fundamental difference between maternal and pater-
nal relationships. The distinction, the appellees argued, was that
,3 The New York adoption statute required the natural mother's consent for the adop-
tion of her illegitimate child. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977). See note 11
supra for the text of this law. Since the mother's husband was also seeking to adopt the
child, it is fairly certain that the mother would not consent to the adoption by the child's
father.
" Because the statute required only the mother's consent for the adoption of an illegiti-
mate child, the natural father had no power to veto the child's adoption by withholding his
own consent. See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977).
95 Justice Powell's majority opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Blackmun. Justices Stewart and Stevens filed separate dissenting opinions. Justice Ste-
vens was joined in his dissent by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist.
" 441 U.S. at 385. Appellees argued that the New York statute did not discriminate
against unwed fathers because the standard that controlled the adoption was the "best in-
terests of the child" rather than the consent of the parents. Appellees contended that the
consent requirement was a "mere formality" because the court's adoption decision would be
based solely on the child's best interests, regardless of whose consent had or had not been
received. Id. at 387. This argument was rejected by the Supreme Court on the basis of a
recent New York decision, Corey L. v. Marlin L., 45 N.Y.2d 383, 408 N.Y.S.2d 439, 380
N.E.2d 266 (1978), in which it was held that the question of consent was entirely separate
from and equally as influential as the question of the child's best interests. In an article
written after the Supreme Court's decision, appellant's counsel in Caban, Robert H. Silk,
referred to Corey L. as "manna from heaven" because it demonstrated decisively that the
"best interests of the child" standard, coupled with the consent requirement, worked
against unwed fathers. See Silk, Adoptions-Making the Unwed Father Equal, 65 WOMEN
LAW. J. 5, 8-9 (1979). ,
17 The majority did not employ the traditional "two-tiered" approach in its analysis of
appellant's equal protection claim, but rather stated that "[g]ender-based distinctions 'must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives. . . .'" 441 U.S. at 388 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
This approach is the same as that used by the majority in In re Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d
at 571, 331 N.E.2d at 488-89, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 515, discussed at note 76 supra and accompa-
nying text.
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"a natural mother, absent special circumstances, bears a closer re-
lationship with her child . . . than a father does."98 While the
Court was willing to assume that unwed mothers as a rule are
closer to their newborn infants than are unwed fathers, 99 the ma-
jority noted. that "this generalization . . . become[s] less accept-
able as a basis for legislative distinctions as the age of the child
increase[s]."' 00 In the Court's view, the facts in Caban, in which a
de facto family relationship existed between the unwed father and
his illegitimate children, demonstrated that an unwed father "may
have a relationship with his children fully comparable to that of
the mother." 101 In a footnote, the Court contrasted Caban's situa-
tion with that of the putative father in Quilloin who had never
lived with nor assumed any responsibility for his illegitimate
child.10 2 The majority concluded that the broad gender-based dis-
crimination in the New York statute was not "required by any uni-
versal difference between maternal and paternal relations at every
phase of the child's development."103
The Court next considered appellees' contention, based on the
New York Court of Appeals' reasoning in Malpica-Orsini,10 that
the distinction between unwed fathers and unwed mothers was
substantially related to New York's interest in promoting the
adoption of illegitimate children.10 5 The Supreme Court agreed
that the state's interest was an important one, observing that
adoption is often a preferable alternative for children born out of
wedlock because it not only provides these children with the stabil-
11 441 U.S. at 388 (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg., at 41).
9 Id. at 389. This is one point on which the majority and the two dissents seemed to be
in agreement. See notes 120 and 125 infra and accompanying text.
'00 441 U.S. at 389.
10l Id.
1*2 Id. at 389 n.7. The Court evidently noticed no inconsistency in the fact that it had
upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia statute in Quilloin which has essentially the same
consent requirements as the New York statute it would now strike down as unconstitutional
in Caban. See notes 39-60 supra and accompanying text. The Court noted only that the
gender-based distinction in the Georgia statute had not been discussed because the question
had not been properly presented in Quilloin. 441 U.S. at 389 n.7.
103. 441 U.S. at 389.
I0, The Mapica-Orsini case is discussed at notes 68-82 supra and accompanying text.
100 36 N.Y.2d at 572-74, 331 N.E.2d at 489-91, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 515-17, discussed at 441
U.S. at 389-90.
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ity of a two-parent home, but also helps to remove the stigma of
ilegitimacy.106 Nonetheless, the Court objected to the arbitrary
statutory presumption that unmarried fathers always impede the
adoption of their children.1 07 The majority noted that unwed fa-
thers are no more likely to object to the adoption of their children
than unwed mothers. Consequently, the Court found that an un-
differentiated gender-based discrimination could not be justified
on this ground.10 8
The Court also addressed the argument raised previously in
Malpica-Orsini0 9 that a requirement of the consent of unwed fa-
thers would impede adoptions because putative fathers are often
difficult to locate and identify.110 The majority conceded that these
difficulties may justify a legislative distinction between the
mothers and fathers of newborns,1 but stated that such an inflex-
ible distinction was not justified in the adoption of older chil-
dren. " 2 The Court suggested that adoption statutes should be
structured to give consent and veto powers only to those parents,
both male and female, who had shown some tangible interest in
and had taken responsibility for the care and rearing of the
child. 1 The Court observed that the overbroad discrimination in
the New York law had the effect of excluding fathers who had
manifested a significant interest in the child from participating in
the adoption of the child, while at the same time possibly enabling
some alienated, uncaring mothers to cut off the father's rights arbi-
" 441 U.S. at 391.
107 Id. at 391-92. The Court cited the proposition that a statutory classification "must
be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest on some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation ... " Id. at 391 (quoting Royster Guano
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
208 Id. at 391-92.
109 See notes 68-82 supra and accompanying text.
110 441 U.S. at 392-93.
"I Id. at 392. After expressing this view, the Court noted that, because the question
was not properly before it, it would "express no view" whether a strict gender-based dis-
crimination would be justified in a statute pertaining solely to newborns. Id. at 392 n.11.
112 Id. at 392.
Is The Court stated that "nothing in the Equal Protection Clause precludes the State
from withholding. . . the privilege of vetoing the adoption of a child" from a father who
"never has come forward or has abandoned the child." Id.
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trarily.11 4 Accordingly, the Supreme Court struck down the New
York adoption law as unconstitutional. The majority held that the
undifferentiated distinction made between unwed fathers and un-
wed mothe:rs in all circumstances, including those where the father
had established a relationship with the child, violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 115
Justices Stewart and Stevens separately dissented in Caban.1"8
Both opinions tracked the reasoning of the New York Court of Ap-
peals in Malpica-Orsini that the state's interest in promoting the
welfare of its illegitimate children justified the gender-based dis-
crimination in the New York adoption law. Both justices focused
their discussions on the best interests of the illegitimate children,
rather thart on the interests of unwed fathers.17
Justice Stewart observed that if the consent of both parents
were required for every adoption, most illegitimate children would
remain illegitimate due to the time and expense often involved in
locating both parents.1 8 Consequently, he reasoned, both humane
and practical considerations demanded that the consent of only
one parent be required for the adoption of children born out of
wedlock. 1 9 Justice Stewart concluded that the mother was the nat-
ural choice for the consenting parent, since it was she who carried
and bore the child and whose parental relationship was more easily
identifiable. 2 ° Justice Stewart found this to be an adequate justifi-
cation for the gender-based distinction in the statute. 21 He added
that adoption statutes which utilize the "best interests of the
child" standard'22 would preclude the automatic termination of a
"1 Id. at 394.
115 Id.
11 See notes 117-29 infra and accompanying text.
11 Justice Stewart correctly pointed out that "there are not two, but three interests at
stake: the mother's, the father's and the children's." 441 U.S. at 400 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
118 Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that illegitimate births accounted
for approximately 15% of all the births in the United States in 1976-77 and that 70% of the
adoptions in 1975 were of illegitimate children. Id. at 402 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1 Id. at 400 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 399 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
122 See note 48 supra for a discussion of the "best interests of the child" standard.
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familial relationship between father and child, such as those estab-
lished in Stanley and Caban, because the child's best interests
might well be promoted by the continuation of the family unit al-
ready in existence.123
A substantial portion of Justice Stevens' dissent, on the other
hand, was devoted to the problems surrounding the adoption of
newborn illegitimate children."" He agreed with the majority that
the special relationship between a mother and her newborn infant
justifies some differential treatment of the unwed mother and fa-
ther at this point in the child's existence. 25 Elaborating on the
need for statutes requiring only the mother's consent for the adop-
tion of newborns, Justice Stevens noted that the absence of such a
rule "would remove the mother's freedom of choice in her own and
the child's behalf without also relieving her of her unshakable re-
sponsibility for the care of the child."' 26 Justice Stevens used these
remarks as a preface for his major contention that, although he did
not agree with the majority in Caban, the decision was one which
would have only a limited effect on future adoption proceedings. 127
Recognizing the possibility that an overly broad reading might be
given to the Court's holding in Caban, Justice Stevens emphasized
that the decision should be applied only to cases where the adop-
tion of an older child is sought and where the father has estab-
lished a substantial relationship with the child. 28 Justice Stevens
predicted that "State legislatures will no doubt promptly revise
their adoption laws to comply with the rule of this case," but ex-
pressed the hope that the "wisdom of the judges" in the state
courts would "forestall any widespread harm" by construing the
holding in Caban to apply only to this narrow factual situation.'2 9
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion accurately pinpointed the
: 441 U.S. at 400 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
43 Id. at 401 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125 Id. at 406-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For the majority's comments on the relation-
ship between an unwed parent and a newborn infant, see note 99 supra and accompanying
text.
126 441 U.S. at 408 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 416-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 416 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 416-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1980] 853
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
major danger in the Caban decision: the possibility that state legis-
latures and courts will overlook the limiting factors in the case and
use Caban as a mandate for the blanket abolition of all adoption
consent statutes which differentiate between unwed fathers and
unwed mothers. Such an overly broad interpretation of the case
would result from a focus only on the result of the decision, rather
than on its rationale. Although the Court struck down the New
York statute as an unconstitutional denial of equal protection to
unwed fathers on the basis of their sex, the majority did provide
some concrete suggestions for the kind of statute that would be
acceptable in its place. First, the Court intimated that a gender-
based classlification in an adoption statute probably would be justi-
fied if the distinction related solely to the adoption of newborns. 30
Second, the Court indicated that an unwed father's rights in his
child do not spring solely from the biological fact of his parentage,
but rather from his willingness to admit his paternity and express
some tangible interest in the child.1 3 The Court noted that the
presence of a de facto family relationship was the distinguishing
factor between Caban and Quilloin, in which an adoption statute
similar to the New York statute was upheld. Suggesting that adop-
tion statutAs should anticipate familial relationships between an
unwed father and his child, the Court stated that the equal protec-
tion clause does not preclude a state from withholding veto powers
from a father who has never come forward to participate in the
rearing of his child.13 2 Therefore, it appears that the majority in
Caban did not intend to promote totally "neutral" adoption stat-
utes that make no gender-based distinctions at all, but rather ones
that do not favor unwed mothers over unwed fathers who have es-
tablished a relationship with their children.
A few states have anticipated the Court's holding in Caban by
adopting a statute that makes distinctions not between unwed
mothers and unwed fathers but between different classes of unwed
fathers. The Uniform Parentage Act distinguishes a "presumed fa-
ther" as one who has either married the child's mother or who has
110 See notb 99 supra and accompanying text
1 See nob.s 100-02 supra and accompanying text.
132 441 U.S. at 392.
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"receive[d] the child into his home and openly holds out the child
as his natural child.' 3 3 A "presumed father" may prevent his
child's adoption by a third party, while a merely biological father
may not.134
In contrast to the classification of unwed fathers in the Uniform
Parentage Act, the post-Caban adoption decisions in New York re-
flect only the ultimate result in the Supreme Court's deci-
sion-that all unwed fathers must not be discriminated against
solely on the basis of their gender. 3 5 The reaction of the New York
courts to Caban serves to justify Justice Stevens' fear that some
states would interpret that ruling too broadly. In attempting to ap-
ply the Caban mandates in the absence of a statute, a New York
court concluded in a recent case' 36 that the Caban decision re-
quires comparable treatment of unwed fathers and unwed mothers.
Thus, the court held that an unwed father must be served with the
same notice that an unwed mother would be entitled to receive
even if his identity and whereabouts are unknown. 3 7 The court
noted that "this wasteful impediment on the conclusion of the
adoption process to the prejudice of children in need of adoption
[from] being incorporated into permanent family units is a socially
unacceptable circumstance that cries out for the commencement of
a quest for a better way."' 38 The New York court obviously found
that what it deemed to be the mandate of Caban would impose a
tremendous burden on the entire adoption system. It urged the
New York legislature to enact an adoption statute that would dis-
tinguish between interested fathers and "fleeting disinterested im-
pregnators who are not available when the mother is executing her
13 UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 7004. This Act has been adopted in six states. See CAL.
CIV. CODE § 7004 (West 1975); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 19-6-101 to -129 (1978); HAwAII REv.
STAT. §§ 584-1 to -26 (1976); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-101 to -303 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE
ch. 14-17 (Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ch. 26-26 (Supp. 1981). For a detailed discus-
sion of this Act, see Comment, The Uniform Parentage Act: What It Will Mean for the
Putative Father in California, 28 HAsTINGS L.J. 191 (1977).
134 UNIFORM PARENTAGE AT § 7017.
131 See note 115 supra and accompanying text.
186 In re Cecilie Ann T., 101 Misc. 2d 472, 421 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1979).
237 Id. at 477, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 170-71.
138 Id., 421 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
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surrender of the child or consent to adoption." '13
Even if the courts and legislatures follow the "narrow" view of
Caban by distinguishing between unwed fathers who have estab-
lished a relationship with their children and those who have not,
one fact pattern would continue to present problems concerning
the potential veto power of unwed fathers. The unaddressed situa-
tion is the case in which the unwed mother conceals the existence
of a child from the child's biological father until after an adoption
of the child has been completed. 140 A broad interpretation of
Caban would preclude the child's adoption without the consent of
the child's father. A narrow reading of Caban would deny veto
power to a father who has never been afforded an opportunity to
take an interest in his child. If the child is adopted as an infant,
the newborn exception discussed by the Court,14 1 which allows gen-
der-based discrimination favoring unwed mothers because they are
so uniquely close to their infants, probably would justify requiring
only the mother's consent for the adoption. If the child is older,
however, the problems posed by the Court's ambiguous holding in
Caban become evident. The issue in this situation would be
whether an unwed father can be denied the right to object to the
adoption of a child with whom he has never had the chance to
form a de facto family relationship. A case of this sort would force
the Supreme Court to clarify exactly which interpretation it in-
.39 Id. at 478, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
140 This problem has emerged recently in In re Joseph Ryan Riggs, - Tenn. App. -,
- S.W.2d _, cert. denied, - Tenn. _. - S.W.2d - (1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W.
3618 (1981). In this case, an unmarried mother, who refused to marry the father of her soon
to be born child, fled to another state where she gave birth to the baby and signed the birth
certificate using an assumed name. Soon after his birth, the baby was given up for adoption
by the mother who claimed on the surrender documents that the father was "unknown" to
her. The baby was adopted by a couple who had taken care of him since the third day of his
life. It was not until after the final adoption decree had been granted that the natural father
was able to locate the child. The father was successful in having the adoption decree ren-
dered nugatory. Although he had never established any relationship with the child, the
court, citing Caban, found him to be "the birth father, the de facto father and the de jure
father of the minor child" whose consent was thus necessary before the child could be
adopted. - Tenn. App. at -, - S.W.2d at -
141 See note 99 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this exception. The
court in In re Joseph Ryan Riggs, discussed at note 140 supra, apparently gave no consider-
ation to this exception.
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tended to be given to Caban.142
Until such clarification is made by the Supreme Court, state leg-
islatures should not act too quickly to abolish all gender-based dis-
tinctions in their adoption statutes. The consequence of such stat-
utory modification would be to impede or totally block the
adoption of many illegitimate children whose putative fathers ei-
ther cannot be found or who have refused to establish any relation-
ship with them. A better approach would be to replace the gender-
based distinctions with the model suggested by the Uniform Par-
entage Act,143 which distinguishes between a natural father who
has exhibited some tangible interest in his child and one who has
not. In addition, states should not limit the focus of the adoption
statutes to the rights of the parents of the child.1 44 A standard
such as or similar to the "best interests of the child" standard 45
should be incorporated into each statute. Although criticized by
some as too broad and too vague, 46 such a standard would provide
guidance for judges in cases in which an examination of the rights
of unwed parents may be inadequate.1 47 Finally, each state statute
should provide for the appointment of an independent attorney or
guardian ad litem to represent the child in adoption proceedings. 48
142 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case of In re Joseph Ryan
Riggs, discussed at note 140 supra. 49 U.S.L.W. 3618 (1981).
141 See notes 133-34 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinctions
suggested by the Uniform Parentage Act.
14 In his dissenting opinion in Caban, Justice Stewart suggested that the interest of
the child must not be forgotten in an adoption battle between the child's natural parents.
441 U.S. at 400 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See note 117 supra.
'41 See note 48 supra for a discussion of the "best interests of the child" standard.
146 See note 48 supra.
117 For example, in In re Joseph Ryan Riggs, discussed at note 140 supra, the court's
broad interpretation of Caban and consequent avoidance of the adoption decree was based
solely on an examination of the competing rights of the natural parents. The court did not
consider the fact that the child had been living with his adoptive parents since he was three
days old. It is questionable whether it was in the child's "best interests" to separate him
from the only parents he had ever known.
148 The suggestion that children have a right to counsel in all cases pertaining to their
custody or placement has been made by both legal practitioners and experts in child psy-
chology. In Inker & Perretta, A Child's Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, in ABA SECTION
OF FAmmy LAW, THE YoUNGFsT MisoRrrY 32 (S. Katz ed. 1974), the authors state that both
the due process clause and the equal protection clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments require that a child receive independent representation in cases such as adoption and
custody hearings in which the child's welfare is at stake. Id. at 40-43. Other authors suggest
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The presence of an advocate for the child would help not only to
ensure thatb a thorough investigation has been made to discover
whether either or both of the child's parents have expressed any
tangible interest in the child, but also to facilitate the adoption of
the child when such a parent has not been found. The child's rep-
resentative would be able to give objective evidence of the true
"best interests" of the child so that the various controversies con-
cerning the rights of both the natural and adoptive parents would
not overshadow what should be the ultimate concern of any adop-
tion proceeding: the welfare of the child.
MARY F. RADFORD
that the child should be made an indispensable party in any case involving his placement
and should have the right to representation by counsel. J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 48, at 65-
67.
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